Introduction
T hus far, I have presented the case that the jus ad bellum debate generated by the invasion of Iraq was phrased in much broader terms than one might have expected, especially given the narrow form the right to war had assumed over the course of the twentieth century. Chapter 1 recounted the rise of the restrictive legalist paradigm and submitted it as constituting the dominant mode of jus ad bellum discourse since the conclusion of the First World War. Following this, Chapters 2, 3, and 4 related how the various justifications offered (by Bush and Blair) for the invasion of Iraq disregarded this mold and suggested, respectively, that the ends of anticipation, punishment, and humanitarianism provided grounds for the use of force against Iraq in March 2003. Additionally, these chapters demonstrated how these various justifications resonated with a number of tropes, themes, and commitments usually associated with certain classical articulations of just war. Collectively, then, these chapters comprise an extended analysis of the innovative and potentially consequential manner in which the just war tradition was engaged by Bush and Blair as they sought to legitimate an extremely divisive war. Chapter 5 extended this analysis by examining the manner by which the just war tradition is referred to, and deployed, in the course of moral debate, while also indicating how the tradition might be reconstituted through this very activity. In doing so, it sought to draw out and elaborate the various assumptions, conditions, and commitments that we construe as the defining postulates of the tradition. It concluded that the just war tradition is best approached as a self-reflexive tradition comprising a moral vocabulary and mode of reasoning, historically associated with the idea of just war, and an interpretative community arguing about how best to make sense of it.
All of this leads us to the present, and final, chapter. If Chapter 5 called our attention to the rather open-textured nature of the just war tradition, and its rich capacity for renovation and evolution, it also prompted the question of how this might express itself. This chapter will examine the tradition's capacity for change and evolution as manifested in the moral debate prompted by Bush and Blair's determination to invade Iraq. With this in mind, it inquires what developments the Iraq debate has precipitated within the just war tradition today and how these developments are being negotiated. The focus, therefore, is upon the interpretative community and the debates that raged within it regarding the invasion of Iraq.
1 The just war tradition is, after all (as Chapter 5 noted), what its interpretative community makes of it. This is the point that David Armstrong and Theo Farrell are making when they refer to the just war tradition as a "site" rather than a "source" of legitimacy.
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This chapter, then, will examine how proposals for change and evolution were submitted and contested within the just war community during the Iraq debate. By studying the debates taking place within this community, we should achieve some appreciation of (1) the developments the Iraq debate has occasioned within the just war tradition today and (2) how these developments are being negotiated. With this end in view, this chapter will revisit the various justifications offered for the invasion of Iraq in order to evaluate whether they might have affected some change upon the jus ad bellum. The first three sections will deal respectively with the debates regarding anticipation, punishment, and humanitarianism. The concluding remarks of this chapter will address whether these debates have indeed enacted change upon the just war tradition. The underlying aim is to present an account of the stories of change, continuity, and contestation that constitute the tradition's ongoing evolution.
Anticipation
As Chapter 2 recounted, Bush and Blair provoked major debates within the just war community in the period immediately preceding the invasion of Iraq by articulating a more far-reaching right to anticipatory war with which many just war theorists have appeared uncomfortable. Indeed, it reached far beyond the bounds of the legalist paradigm and challenged, as Kofi Annan noted, the most basic rules governing the use of force in international affairs.
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The radical element in Bush and Blair's formulation was rooted in a relaxed understanding of how proximate or extant a threat must be before a state acquires the right to take defensive measures. This section is dedicated to
